

Leaving the European Union: Impact on the Good Friday Agreement

Debate on 11 October 2018

On 11 October 2018, the House of Lords is scheduled to debate a motion moved by Lord Dubs (Labour) on the “impact on the Good Friday Agreement of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union”.

This Briefing provides background information on the changing context for the Good Friday Agreement represented by Brexit; summarises aspects of the withdrawal negotiations particularly relating to Northern Ireland; and provides a summary of the political context in which the negotiations are currently taking place within the UK. It then provides a brief overview of recent developments relating to the three main strands of the Agreement in the context of Brexit, before concluding with a selection of suggested reading for additional information on this sensitive and complex subject.

Introduction

The Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement and hereafter referred to as ‘the Agreement’) marked a landmark moment in the Northern Ireland peace process. Widely considered to have ended a period of violence and conflict known as ‘the Troubles’, it paved the way for devolved power-sharing in the province and new institutions for Northern Ireland-Ireland (North-South) and UK-Ireland (East-West) cooperation. Signed just over 20 years ago on 10 April 1998, the accord was reached at a time when both the UK and Ireland were member states of the European Union (EU).¹ The UK’s decision to leave the EU therefore represents a change to the context in which the Agreement has operated and developed over the past two decades.²

The UK Government has acknowledged the complexity of the issues arising from this forthcoming change in context. In a position paper published last summer, it stated that during Brexit negotiations the UK and EU needed to be “particularly mindful” of several themes connected with the Agreement. These included the “constitutional context and framework for North-South and East-West cooperation; the border; citizenship rights; and the Northern Ireland economy in recognition of the importance of economic prosperity to sustaining the peace process”.³ The EU has also raised the importance of these issues. The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, has described Brexit as having given rise to a “complex challenge” for which practical solutions needed to be found to “avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland”.⁴ The border issue has been prominent in the negotiations to date due to disagreements between the UK and EU as to how the existing ‘soft border’ between Northern Ireland and Ireland can be maintained in the context of the UK’s intention to ultimately leave the EU’s customs union. Regarding the Agreement in particular, Mr Barnier has stated that he is “committed to finding [...] a solution that protects the Good Friday Agreement, North-South cooperation and the functioning of the all-island economy”.⁵

However, the impact of the UK's withdrawal from the EU on the Agreement is itself contested. For example, Lord Trimble (Conservative), a former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party who was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 in recognition of his role in efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, is reported to have claimed that it is "rubbish that Brexit will undermine the Good Friday Agreement". He suggested that the imposition of a 'hard border' was not "inevitable" if the UK left the EU's single market and customs union following its withdrawal.⁶ In contrast, the Irish Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, has alleged that Brexit represents a "threat to the Good Friday Agreement" because "it threatens to drive a wedge between Britain and Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and potentially between the two communities [unionists and nationalists] in Northern Ireland".⁷

Background: Brexit Negotiations and Political Context

Brexit Negotiations

On 29 March 2017, Prime Minister Theresa May notified European Council President Donald Tusk of the UK's intention to leave the EU under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union. In her notification letter, Mrs May wrote that the UK and EU had an "important responsibility to make sure that nothing is done to jeopardise the peace process in Northern Ireland, and to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement".⁸ Since then, both the UK and the EU have affirmed the importance of upholding the Agreement in its entirety. For example, in August 2017 the Government published a position paper on how it envisaged addressing the "unique circumstances" of Northern Ireland and Ireland in the context of the UK's withdrawal from the EU. In this document, the Government affirmed its continuing commitment to uphold the Agreement and cited both the EU's and Irish Government's ongoing support for the accord.⁹ Later, in December 2017, the UK and EU agreed a joint report on progress during phase I of the Brexit negotiations. In this report, both the UK and EU agreed that the Agreement "must be protected in all its parts", and that this extended to the "practical application of the 1998 Agreement on the island of Ireland and to the totality of the relationships set out in the Agreement".¹⁰ As part of the joint report, the UK undertook to introduce a 'backstop' to be used as a last resort in the absence of agreed solutions to the border issue, through which it would "maintain full alignment with those rules of the internal [single] market and the customs union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement".¹¹ Citizenship rights and North-South cooperation were identified as issues that would require special consideration in the next stage of the negotiations.¹²

In July 2018, the UK Government published a white paper on the future relationship between the UK and the EU in which it proposed a future 'economic partnership' between the two parties in which a 'common rulebook' would apply for goods, including agri-food. This would cover "only those rules necessary to provide for frictionless trade at the border", in place of continued UK membership of the single market and/or customs union.¹³ The Government argued that, in sum, the components of this partnership would:

[...] see the UK and the EU meet their commitments to Northern Ireland and Ireland through the overall future relationship: preserving the constitutional and economic integrity of the UK; honouring the letter and the spirit of the Belfast ('Good Friday') Agreement; and ensuring that the operational legal text the UK will agree with the EU on the 'backstop' solution as part of the withdrawal agreement will not have to be used.¹⁴

However, in September 2018 the UK's proposed blueprint for the future relationship was rejected at an informal summit of EU leaders in Salzburg, Austria. EU Council President Donald Tusk stated that the UK's suggested framework for economic cooperation would "not work, not least because it risks undermining the single market".¹⁵ Furthermore, the leaders of the 27 remaining EU member states affirmed their "full unity" behind the position that there would be "no withdrawal agreement without a solid, operational and legally binding Irish backstop" to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland.¹⁶ At the time of writing, negotiations on a solution to the backstop issue, which has been one of the main areas of difficulty in the negotiations so far, were ongoing. The next European Council meeting, when outstanding issues such as the backstop are set to be revisited by EU heads of state and government, is scheduled to take place on 18 October 2018.¹⁷

Political Context in the UK and Northern Ireland

In the UK, several factors have been cited as relevant to discussions on the future of the Agreement. These include, for example:

- The Conservative Party is currently governing at Westminster under a confidence and supply agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Although both parties have agreed to "adhere fully to their respective commitments set out in the Belfast Agreement and its successors" as part of this arrangement, it has been noted by some commentators, including Professor Colin Harvey of Queen's University Belfast and Alan Whysall of the UCL Constitution Unit, that the confidence and supply deal has raised concerns in some quarters, including among some in the nationalist community, regarding the UK Government's ability to discharge its duty to be 'rigorously impartial' in dealings with Northern Ireland under the terms of the Agreement.¹⁸
- The Irish nationalist community no longer has a formal presence in the UK House of Commons following the 2017 general election. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), a nationalist party, lost the three seats it had previously held at that election. Meanwhile, Sinn Féin, which maintains an abstentionist policy at Westminster, increased the number of candidates elected from four to seven.¹⁹
- Some Leave-supporting British politicians have questioned the continued relevance of the Agreement in the context of the UK's ongoing negotiations with the EU. For example, the former Conservative Northern Ireland Secretary Owen Paterson and Labour MP Kate Hoey are reported to have expressed the view that the Agreement had "outlived its use".²⁰

In Northern Ireland, additional complicating factors have been raised. Firstly, although the UK as a whole voted to leave the EU in the referendum held in June 2016 (by 51.9 percent to 48.1 percent), a majority in Northern Ireland voted to remain (55.8 percent to 44.2 percent).²¹ According to Professor Jonathan Tonge of the University of Liverpool, support for either remain or leave appears to have been correlated—although to differing extents—with community identity at the time. He has observed that a majority of nationalists voted remain and that unionists tended to vote in favour of leave.²² This illustrates the apparent absence of the cross-community support that is usually required for major decisions taken in Northern Ireland.²³

Secondly, the continued absence of a functioning executive in Northern Ireland since the resignation of the late Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister in January 2017 has meant that for over 18 months Northern Ireland ministers have not been involved in mechanisms such as the Joint Ministerial Committee, which provides an opportunity for devolved government ministers to discuss matters such as the UK's withdrawal from the EU with their UK Government counterparts.²⁴ The suspension of the

Assembly and Executive has also led to the suspension of other bodies such as the North-South Ministerial Council, established under the Agreement.²⁵

Brexit: Implications for the Agreement

The Agreement, reached in 1998 following all-party negotiations that had begun in 1996, was formed of two parts: a multi-party accord reached between most major political parties active in Northern Ireland at the time—except for the DUP which opposed it—and an international agreement between the UK and Irish governments.²⁶ In practice, the Agreement established a new constitutional framework for Northern Ireland consisting of three strands:

- Strand 1 provided for the creation of a democratically elected Northern Ireland Assembly with a power-sharing executive.
- Strand 2 provided for the creation of a North-South Ministerial Council to facilitate cooperation between Northern Ireland and Ireland (North-South cooperation).
- Strand 3 provided for the creation of a British-Irish Council and British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference to encourage cooperation between the UK and Ireland (East-West cooperation).²⁷

Both the UK and Ireland were member states of the EU when the agreement was signed. It is widely held that implementation of the Agreement and subsequent developments have been facilitated, at least in part, by the UK and Ireland's joint membership of EU regimes such as the single market and customs union.²⁸ However, it should be noted that the UK Government contends that the Agreement was not predicated upon this factor, and prominent politicians have suggested that membership of the EU is not a prerequisite for continued cooperation under the Agreement.²⁹

Strand 1: Devolved Institutions

The House of Lords European Union Committee has noted that Brexit has proved “politically divisive” in Northern Ireland.³⁰ It argued tensions caused by differences over Brexit have been a contributing factor in the continuing lack of agreement between the DUP and Sinn Féin—the principal unionist and nationalist parties in the province—to form a power-sharing executive at Stormont.³¹ This factor, coupled with other political factors highlighted above, has been cited by the Committee as something that could lead to “increased instability and the erosion of cross-community support” for the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, a key strand of the Agreement.³²

Strands 2 and 3: North-South and East-West Cooperation

In the joint report issued in December 2017, the UK and EU stated that cooperation between Northern Ireland and Ireland was a central part of the Agreement and was “essential for achieving reconciliation and the normalisation of relationships on the island of Ireland”. The document continued:

The two parties have carried out a mapping exercise, which shows that North-South cooperation relies to a significant extent on a common European Union legal and policy framework. Therefore, the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union gives rise to substantial challenges to the maintenance and development of North-South cooperation.³³

As a remedy to this challenge, the report stated that the UK had agreed to remain committed to “protecting and supporting continued North-South and East-West cooperation across the full range of political, economic, security, societal and agricultural contexts and frameworks of cooperation, including the continued operation of the North-South implementation bodies”. In addition, the document set out, in principle, how the UK would ensure continued North-South cooperation in all eventualities, including a ‘backstop’ arrangement:

The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements. The United Kingdom’s intention is to achieve these objectives through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible, the United Kingdom will propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland. In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the internal [single] market and the customs union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.

In the absence of agreed solutions, as set out in the previous paragraph, the United Kingdom will ensure that no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the United Kingdom internal market.³⁴

In a letter accompanying the joint report’s publication, Prime Minister Theresa May set out six commitments to Northern Ireland. The fifth of these stated that the Government would “uphold the commitments and safeguards set out in the Belfast Agreement regarding North-South cooperation”, which the Prime Minister added would “continue to require cross-community support”.³⁵

The Government is furthermore legally committed to ensuring continued North-South cooperation. Section 10 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 requires ministers to have regard to the joint report when exercising powers under the Act. It would prevent powers under the Act from being used to diminish North-South cooperation as provided for in the Agreement, or to introduce new physical border infrastructure or checks and controls on the Northern Ireland-Ireland border unless they were in accordance with an agreement between the UK and the EU.³⁶

The Government’s white paper on the future relationship between the UK and EU published in July 2018 reaffirmed its commitment to continued North-South cooperation, including in such areas as agriculture, road transport and the energy market.³⁷ However, negotiations on the regulatory frameworks that will apply in Northern Ireland following the UK’s exit from the EU are ongoing.

Regarding East-West cooperation, in December 2016 the House of Lords European Union Committee noted “concerns over the level of engagement by UK ministers” in East-West fora such as the British-Irish Council, and recommended that the Government “show the fullest possible commitment to supporting intergovernmental dialogue, especially with regard to Brexit”.³⁸ In September 2017, the Government responded that maintaining close relationships with the Irish Government, including through the British-Irish Council, was “extremely important”.³⁹ Three months later, in the UK-EU joint report published in December 2017, the Government stated that it was committed to continued cooperation “across the full range of political, economic, security, societal and agricultural contexts and frameworks of cooperation” following the UK’s departure from the EU.⁴⁰ These commitments have

been made in the context that the EU will no longer be available as a forum for both parties to discuss such issues after the UK's departure.⁴¹

Amending the Agreement

A further impact may be the need to amend the wording of the Agreement to remove references that will no longer be applicable.⁴² As noted by the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee earlier this year, the Agreement contains references to the EU. These include:

- a reference in the introduction to the UK and Ireland as “partners in the European Union”;
- an instruction for the North-South Ministerial Council to consider “the European Union dimension of relevant matters”; and
- approaches to “EU issues” as a proposed topic for discussion in the British-Irish Council.⁴³

In May 2018, the Committee recommended that the next Northern Ireland Executive should launch a consultation on the future of the Agreement within six months of taking office. In the continued absence of an executive, the Committee recommended that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland should “consult with the parties in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government on how a review mechanism could be progressed and what the scope of that review should be”. It added that the consultation should be “wide-ranging and ensure that both sides of the community are fully heard”.⁴⁴ In its response, the Government stated that it remained “focused on restoring a functioning power-sharing Executive to Northern Ireland”.⁴⁵ It added that the “Secretary of State keeps a number of options under review in the event of the continued absence of devolution, including the prospect of a further assembly election and ultimately other arrangements”.

On 1 October 2018, DUP Leader Arlene Foster gave an interview with the *Daily Telegraph* in which she stated that it had been “deeply frustrating to hear people who voted remain and in Europe talk about Northern Ireland as though we can’t touch the Belfast Agreement”.⁴⁶ She added that “things evolve, even in the EU context” and alleged that there had been a “lot of misinterpretation, holding it up as a sacrosanct piece of legislation”.⁴⁷ Following publication of these comments, Leo Varadkar, the Irish Taoiseach, responded by stating that the Agreement was not up for substantive renegotiation, contending that it could only be changed with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments.⁴⁸

Other Issues

As indicated above, the UK's withdrawal from the EU presents a complex range of potential challenges to the status quo in Northern Ireland. Other issues that have been raised include possible changes in the visibility of the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, the future of which is closely linked to the future relationship to be agreed between the UK and the EU; security concerns relating to the possible future installation of border infrastructure as part of changes in the customs and regulatory relationship between the UK and EU; citizenship rights; and the continuation of funding for peace programmes.

Key Information

- House of Lords European Union Committee, [Brexit: UK-Irish Relations](#), 12 December 2016, HL Paper 76 of session 2016–17, pp 3–7 and 39–57; and [Government Response](#), 5 September 2017
- House of Lords European Union Committee, [Brexit: Devolution](#), 19 July 2017, HL Paper 9 of session 2017–19, pp 3–4 and 13–25; and [Government Response](#), 14 September 2017, pp 1–4
- House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, [The Land Border Between Northern Ireland and Ireland](#), 16 March 2018, HC 329 of session 2017–19, pp 3–5 and 42–52; and [Government Response](#), 15 June 2018, HC 1198 of session 2017–19
- Congressional Research Service, [Northern Ireland, Brexit, and the Irish Border](#), 12 March 2018
- Northern Ireland Office, '[Secretary of State Reaffirms Commitment of UK Government to Belfast Agreement](#)', 10 April 2018

Further Information

- [Debate on 'Brexit: UK-Irish Relations'](#), HL Hansard, 5 September 2017, cols 1852–73 and 1909–48
- House of Lords Library, [Brexit Preparations and Negotiations](#), 18 July 2018
- House of Commons Library, [Brexit Negotiations: The Irish Border Question](#), 17 July 2017
- Congressional Research Service, [Northern Ireland: Current Issues and Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process](#), 12 March 2018

¹ The Agreement describes the UK and Ireland as “partners in the European Union” (Northern Ireland Office, [Belfast Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations](#), 10 April 1998, p 32). The UK and Ireland both acceded to the then European Communities in 1973, along with Denmark (European Union, '[About the EU: The 28 Member Countries of the EU](#)', accessed 1 October 2018).

² House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, [The Land Border Between Northern Ireland and Ireland](#), 16 March 2018, HC 329 of session 2017–19, pp 42–3.

³ HM Government, [Northern Ireland and Ireland: Position Paper](#), 16 August 2017, p 4.

⁴ Michel Barnier, '[Michel Barnier: I'm Committed to a Brexit Deal that Protects Belfast Agreement but Respects UK Constitution](#)', *Belfast Telegraph*, 1 May 2018.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Hugh Bennett, '[Trimble: 'Rubbish' that Brexit will Undermine Good Friday Agreement](#)', BrexitCentral, 19 February 2018. See also: BBC News, '[Brexiters Branded 'Reckless' Over NI Peace Process](#)', 20 February 2018.

⁷ David Smith, '[Brexit Threatens Good Friday Agreement, Irish PM Warns](#)', *Guardian*, 14 March 2018.

⁸ Prime Minister's Office, [Prime Minister's Letter to Donald Tusk Triggering Article 50](#), 29 March 2017, p 5.

⁹ HM Government, [Northern Ireland and Ireland: Position Paper](#), 16 August 2017, pp 4 and 26–7.

¹⁰ Prime Minister's Office and Department for Exiting the European Union, [Joint Report on Progress During Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK's Orderly Withdrawal from the EU](#), 8 December 2017, p 7.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p 8.

¹² House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, [The Land Border Between Northern Ireland and Ireland](#), 16 March 2018, HC 329 of session 2017–19, p 43.

¹³ HM Government, [The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union](#), 12 July 2018, Cm 9593, p 8.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p 9.

¹⁵ Reuters, '[October EU Summit will be 'Moment of Truth' for Brexit Talks: EU's Tusk](#)', 20 September 2018.

¹⁶ European Council, '[Informal Meeting of Heads of State or Government, 19–20 September 2018](#)', accessed 1 October 2018. For further information on the backstop proposals, see: House of Lords Library, [Brexit Preparations and Negotiations](#), 18 July 2018, pp 29–34.

- ¹⁷ European Council, '[European Council \(Article 50\), 18 October 2018](#)', accessed 1 October 2018.
- ¹⁸ Cabinet Office, '[Agreement Between the Conservative and Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party on Support for the Government in Parliament](#)', 26 June 2017, p 2. See also: Colin Harvey, '[Northern Ireland and Rigorous Impartiality: Untangling a Constitutional Mess](#)', Queen's University Belfast QPol Blog, 13 June 2017; and Alan Whysall, '[The Good Friday Agreement at 20: What Went Wrong?](#)', UCL Constitution Unit Blog, 10 April 2018.
- ¹⁹ UK Parliament website, '[House of Commons: Current State of the Parties](#)', accessed 1 October 2018.
- ²⁰ Peter Geoghehan, '[Brexiters Launch Broadside at Northern Ireland Peace Deal](#)', Politico Europe, 22 February 2018.
- ²¹ Electoral Commission, '[EU Referendum Results](#)', accessed 1 October 2018.
- ²² Jonathan Tonge, '[The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland](#)', *Political Quarterly*, July–September 2016, vol 87 no 3, p 338; and House of Lords European Union Committee, '[Brexit: Devolution](#)', 19 July 2017, HL Paper 9 of session 2017–19, p 13.
- ²³ Jonathan Tonge, '[The Impact of Withdrawal from the European Union upon Northern Ireland](#)', *Political Quarterly*, July–September 2016, vol 87 no 3, pp 338–9.
- ²⁴ See, for example: Cabinet Office, '[Joint Ministerial Committee \(EU Negotiations\) Communiqué](#)', 13 September 2018.
- ²⁵ Cathal McCall, '[The Travails of the North/South Ministerial Council](#)', Political Studies Association Blog, 10 April 2018.
- ²⁶ Northern Ireland Office, '[Belfast Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations](#)', 10 April 1998.
- ²⁷ Northern Ireland Office, '[The Belfast Agreement](#)', accessed 1 October 2018; and House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, '[The Land Border Between Northern Ireland and Ireland](#)', 16 March 2018, HC 329 of session 2017–19, p 42.
- ²⁸ Alan Whysall, '[The Good Friday Agreement at 20: What Went Wrong?](#)', UCL Constitution Unit Blog, 10 April 2018; and Hugh Bennett, '[Trimble: 'Rubbish' that Brexit will Undermine Good Friday Agreement](#)', BrexitCentral, 19 February 2018.
- ²⁹ HM Government, '[Northern Ireland and Ireland: Position Paper](#)', 16 August 2017, p 4.
- ³⁰ House of Lords European Union Committee, '[Brexit: UK-Irish Relations](#)', 12 December 2016, HL Paper 76 of session 2016–17, p 44.
- ³¹ See, for example: Arthur Beesley, '[Brexit Shadow Bedevils Rebuilding Stormont Executive](#)', *Financial Times* (£), 8 January 2018.
- ³² House of Lords European Union Committee, '[Brexit: Devolution](#)', 19 July 2017, HL Paper 9 of session 2017–19, p 3.
- ³³ Prime Minister's Office and Department for Exiting the European Union, '[Joint Report on Progress During Phase I of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK's Orderly Withdrawal from the EU](#)', 8 December 2017, p 8.
- ³⁴ *ibid.*
- ³⁵ Prime Minister's Office, '[Commitments to Northern Ireland](#)', 8 December 2017, p 2.
- ³⁶ House of Lords Library, '[Brexit Preparations and Negotiations](#)', 18 July 2018, p 30.
- ³⁷ HM Government, '[The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union](#)', 12 July 2018, Cm 9593.
- ³⁸ House of Lords European Union Committee, '[Brexit: UK-Irish Relations](#)', 12 December 2016, HL Paper 76 of session 2016–17, p 52.
- ³⁹ Department for Exiting the European Union, '[Letter to Lord Jay of Ewelme, Acting Chair of the European Union Committee](#)', 5 September 2017, p 4.
- ⁴⁰ Prime Minister's Office and Department for Exiting the European Union, '[Joint Report on Progress During Phase I of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the UK's Orderly Withdrawal from the EU](#)', 8 December 2017, p 8.
- ⁴¹ House of Lords European Union Committee, '[Brexit: UK-Irish Relations](#)', 12 December 2016, HL Paper 76 of session 2016–17, pp 50–2.
- ⁴² European Parliament, '[Briefing: The Impact and Consequences of Brexit for Northern Ireland](#)', 17 March 2017, p 6.
- ⁴³ House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, '[The Land Border Between Northern Ireland and Ireland](#)', 16 March 2018, HC 329 of session 2017–19, p 42.
- ⁴⁴ House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, '[Devolution and Democracy in Northern Ireland: Dealing with the Deficit](#)', 22 May 2018, HC 613 of session 2017–19, pp 7–8.
- ⁴⁵ House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, '[Devolution and Democracy in Northern Ireland: Dealing with the Deficit—Government Response](#)', 14 September 2018, HC 1589 of session 2017–19, pp 9–10.
- ⁴⁶ Harry Yorke and Gordon Rayner, '[We Would Work with Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Says DUP Leader, as She Praises His 'Positive' Brexit Vision](#)', *Daily Telegraph* (£), 1 October 2018.
- ⁴⁷ *Belfast Telegraph*, '[Arlene Foster's Comments on Good Friday Agreement 'Reckless'—Sinn Féin](#)', 2 October 2018.
- ⁴⁸ *Belfast Telegraph*, '[Good Friday Agreement Not Up For Renegotiation, Says Leo Varadkar](#)', 2 October 2018. See also: John Campbell, '[DUP 'Won't Accept' Brexit Irish Sea Checks](#)', BBC News, 2 October 2018.

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